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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to the major bar associations, there has been little success in bar integration
drives.3r
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the fact that there are many valid arguments pro and
con, objectively appraised the integrated bar is not an end in itself. It exists
as a means of developing high professional standards in a complex society.
As a means only, its justification depends on the existence of an actual need.
Should it not affirmatively appear, therefore, that voluntary bar associations
are inadequate to the needs of a particular jurisdiction before an integrated
bar is considered as an alternative?
It appears that such a need may exist where membership in a voluntary bar
association is below seventy-five per cent of the practicing attorneys of that
jurisdiction. It must be conceded that a fixed percentage can never be more
than an arbitrary point of departure. Nevertheless, past experience shows
that where active membership in voluntary organizations is above the seventy-
five per cent figure, the need for bar integration has found little support and
no actual success. Certainly if there be no need and nothing substantial
to be gained, why then impinge upon, even if in the constitutional sense it
be no violation of, the individual attorney's freedom of association?
IMPLIED WARRANTY AND THE DEFENSE OF PRIVITY IN A
PERSONAL INJURY ACTION
INTRODUCTION
Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act,1 by operation of law, imposes upon the
seller certain implied warranties which are intended to mitigate the common-
law doctrine of caveat emptorY In order to limit the liability imposed by
implied warranties, the doctrine of privity as enunciated in Winterbottom v.
Wright3 was applied to warranty as well as negligence cases. MacPherson v.
37. See Edmonds, Integration of the Bar: A Boon or A Bust?, 32 N.Y.S.B. Bull, 297,
301 (1960).
1. "Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there Is no
implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of
goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows: (1) Where the buyer,
expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which
the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. (2) Where the goods are bought by
description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of mer-
chantable quality." Uniform Sales Act § 15. The above provisions are also the law In
New York. See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 96(1)-(2).
2. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 Yale L.J. 1133 (1931).
3. 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
[Vol. 30484
Buick Motor Co.4 destroyed the doctrine of privity in negligence law,* but it
has remained a problem in the law of implied warranties. With the decision
of the court of appeals in Greenberg v. LorenZ,7 the question is posed whether
the doctrine of privity as applied in the law of implied warranties has not also
been prepared for destruction.
OLD NEw Yoni LAW
Prior to Greenberg v. Lorenz, New York followed the traditional view that
privity of contract was necessary in an action based on breach of an implied
warranty. In Chysky v. Drake Bros., Co.,s the court of appeals concisely stated
the New York rule:
The general rule is that a manufacturer or seller of food, or other articles of per-
sonal property, is not liable to third persons, under an implied warranty, vho have
no contractual relations with him. The reason for this rule is that privity of con-
tract does not exist between the seller and such third persons, and unleas there ba
privity of contract, there can be no implied warranty0
In the Chysky case plaintiff was injured by a nail in a piece of cake purchased
from defendant by plaintiff's employer. The court of appeals denied plaintiff a
recovery because she was not the immediate purchaser, and the privity rule,
therefore, denied her the protection of any implied warranty.
The rule was assailed as a harsh one, and it was obvious that it could not
long endure without efforts to mitigate its rigorous application. In Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc.,10 the court of appeals introduced an agency
fiction to sanction the first exception to the privity rule. In that case plaintiff-
husband was injured by a pin concealed in a loaf of bread purchased by his
wife. Plaintiff recovered because the wife was considered by the court to be
his agent. In Ginenez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.," again an implied
warranty action, plaintiff-ife was the immediate purchaser of bad crabmeat
and was subsequently injured by eating it. Plaintiff-wife was allowed a
4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 k1916). For a discussion of the cintinuing effect of
the doctrine of this case see Davis, A Re-Examination of the Doctrine of MacPhcrzon v.
Buick and Its Application and Extension in the State of New York, 24 Fordham L. Rev.
204 (1955).
5. In New York privity is not necessary in a case based on fraud or misreprcz.entation,
Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 133 N.Y. 73, 75 N.E. 1093 (IS05); Kennedy v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 643, 200 N.Y. Supp. 121 (1st DLp't 1923); W\echler
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 193 Misc. 340, 99 N.YS.2d 53M (Sup. Ct. 1950); or where
the duty is based on statute, Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newtown By-Products Mfg.
Co., 24S N.Y. 293, 162 N.E. 84 (1923); AMphin v. La Salle Dincr2, Inc., 197 Mizc. 415,
98 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y.C. City CL 1950).
6. Aram & Goodman, Some Problems in the Law of Implied Warranty, 3 Syram-.-
L. Rev. 259, 263-63 (1952).
7. 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
S. 235 N.Y. 46S, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
9. Id. at 472, 139 N.E. at 578.
10. 255 N.Y. 333, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
11. 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
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recovery, but her husband was denied a recovery for consequential damages
because there was no privity of contract between the husband and retailer.
Since the wife brought a direct cause of action for her injuries, she could
not be held to be acting as her husband's agent for the purpose of allowing him
a recovery for consequential damages. Speaking of the husband's right to
recover on an implied warranty theory, the court of appeals also stated that
"the courts have never gone so far as to recognize warranties for the benefit
of third persons."' 2
In Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,'8 the appellate division
extended the agency theory to allow plaintiff a recovery for injuries caused by a
defective bottle of "Wesson" oil purchased by her sister with whom she lived.
Both sisters contributed to household expenses, and for the purpose of bringing
the action for breach of an implied warranty the court reasoned that the
plaintiff's sister was plaintiff's agent in purchasing the bottle of oil. The
agency theory was the one exception recognized in New York prior to Green-
berg v. Lorenz.14
GREENBERG V. LoRENZ
In the now famous New York case of Greenberg v. Lorenz, the court of
appeals took a giant step to mitigate the hardship of the privity rule. Plain-
tiff was injured by eating some salmon from a can purchased by her father for
consumption in the home. On trial in the city court plaintiff and her father were
allowed a recovery on the basis of breach of implied warranty. 15 The appellate
term affirmed, 1 but the appellate division reversed holding that Chysky v.
Drake Bros. Co. 17 was still the New York law.' 8 Chief Judge Desmond writing
for the majority of the court of appeals held that plaintiff should be allowed
a recovery even though privity was lacking, but qualified the holding saying:
So convincing a showing of injustice and impracticality calls upon us to move
but we should be cautious and take one step at a time. To decide the case before
us, we should hold that the infant's cause of action should not have been dismissed
12. Id. at 395, 191 N.E. at 29. See also Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App.
Div. 278, 284-85, 38 N.Y.S.2d 788, 794-95 (1st Dep't 1942).
13. 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dep't 1954), aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 780,
125 N.E.2d 165 (1955).
14. New York has held that a parent could not be considered the agent of a child In
order to allow the child an action for breach of an implied warranty. See, e.g., Redmond
v. Borden's Farm Prods. Co., 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 838 (1927) (memorandum decision) ;
Salzano v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 268 App. Div. 993, 51 N.Y.S.2d 645 (2d Dep't 1944)
(memorandum decision); Smith v. Hanson, 228 App. Div. 634, 238 N.Y. Supp. 86 (2d
Dep't 1929) (per curiam). Contra, Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316
(1943); Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., - Mass. -, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960). For a
discussion of the agency exception in an implied warranty action in New York see Com-
ment, The Privity Rule and the Agency Fiction With Regard to Implied Warranties,
24 Fordham L. Rev. 425 (1955).
15. 14 Misc. 2d 279, 178 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1957).
16. 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. T. 1958).
17. 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
18. 7 App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Ist Dep't 1959) (per curiam).
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solely on the ground that the food was purchased not by the child but by the
child's father.19
The concurring opinion of Judge Froessel demonstrated the conflicting
theories which beset the court of appeals. Is the problem one for the courts
or for the legislature to resolve? Speaking about that Judge Froessel said:
However much one may think liability should be broadened, that must ba left
to the Legislature .... Indeed, the Legislature has not been unaware of the prob-
lem for, in three separate years-1943,2 1945,21 19,92- the New York State
Law Revision Commission recommended that the benefits of implied warranties be
extended to the buyer's employees and to the members of his household, but the
Legislature has declined to act, despite the introduction of legislation.2 3
The court of appeals has served notice that the Grccnbcrg decision is not to
be taken as the signal that New York is prepared to abolish the privity rule.
But it departed at least from the limited agency fiction and stated that where
the relationship between the immediate purchaser and injured consumer is a
familial one, the injured party may bring a direct cause of action for breach
of implied warranty. Whether other persons besides members of the family
would be allowed a direct cause of action in warranty is still left open in
New York. 24
PRIvITY NO LONGER NECESSAIMY
A number of years ago Judge Cardozo in another connection stated that
"the assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace." -
This assault is now being waged against the necessity of privity in both
express and implied warranty actions.
In the field of implied warranties, Henningscn v. Bloomficld Motors, InYc.
has become the landmark case. It completely dispensed with the privity
requirement. The plaintiff there was injured by a defective car purchased by
her husband. The New Jersey court held:
We are convinced that the cause of justice in this area of the law can be served
only by recognizing that she is such a person who, in the reasonable contemplation
of the parties to the warranty, might be expected to become a uzer of the auto-
mobile. Accordingly, her lack of privity does not stand in the way of prozecution
of the injury suit against the defendant. .... 27
19. 9 N.Y.2d at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
20. N.Y. Leg. Dec. No. 65(J) (1943).
21. N. .Leg. Doc.No. 65(A) (1945).
22. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(B) (1959).
23. 9 N.Y.2d at 201, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
24. The lower courts appear to be following the court of appcals' caveat that Green-
berg v. Lorenz is not to be interpreted as abolishing the privity rule in New Yorh. See,
e.g., Rypins v. Rowan, 219 N.Y.S.2d 28S3, 2.9 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Simpson v. Eichenbrunncr,
217 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (App. T. 1961) (per curiam); Anderzon v. Radio Corp. of America,
216 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Levitt v. Ford Motor Co., 215 N.Y.2d 679, 631
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
25. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.. 170, 10, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
26. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), 29 Fordham L. Rcv. 133.
27. Id. at 413, 161 A.2d at 99-100.
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The court found that under modern marketing conditions the requirement of
privity worked many injustices and held that the ultimate consumer could
bring a warranty action against the manufacturer even though there was no
privity of contract.
At the same time a Tennessee court decided that a wife injured by a
car with defective brakes could bring an action in warranty without privity
of contract. 28 In a recent Iowa case 29 involving a similar factual situation
the court said, "It is our opinion that these recent pronouncements in New
Jersey and Tennessee represent the most advanced thinking and the soundest
conclusions in the field of new car warranties, express and implied."30
It remains to be seen whether Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.31 will
be to implied warranties what MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 2 was
to negligence.33
The assault on the citadel of privity is indeed being pressed apace. There
is a substantial advantage to bringing a personal injury action in warranty
rather than in negligence." To establish his case in negligence the plaintiff
must show as a fact that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and
that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer or seller.
The problem of proof can be very difficult, indeed critical, in this day of
mass production. The plaintiff may find it impossible to prove that reasonable
care was not exercised in the manufacturing process. Where an action is
brought in implied warranty the plaintiff need only show that the product
was defective when it left the manufacturer. He is not burdened with proof
of the lack of reasonable care.35
IMPLIED WARRANTY-TORT ACTION
Legal authorities have repeatedly pointed out that the original action of im-
plied warranty was in tort for deceit rather than contract. Williston wrote:
The action was thus conceived of at the outset as an action of tort .... It is prob-
able that to-day most persons instinctively think of a warranty as a contract or
promise; but it is believed that the original character of the action cannot safely
28. General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. 1960).
29. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449 (Iowa
1961).
30. Id. at 456. See also Thompson v. Reedman Motors, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
31. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
32. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
33. For other cases prior to Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., which dispensed
with the requirement of privity of contract in a warranty action see Hector Supply Co.
v. Carter, 122 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1960); Diamond Alkali Co. v. Godwin, 100 Ga. App. 799,
112 S.E.2d 365 (1959); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
34. Meehan, "The Assault Upon the Citadel of Privity": A Recent Communique, 24
Brooklyn L. Rev. 308 (1958).
35. Prosser, Torts § 84, at 505-06 (2d ed. 1955).
be lost sight of, and that the seller's liability upon a warranty may sound in tort
as well as in contract.3
Prosser noted that:
The seller's warranty is a curious hybrid of tort and contract, unique in the law.
In its inception the liability was based on tort, ... the warranty gradually came
to be regarded as a term of the contract of sale, express or implied, for which the
normal remedy is a contract action.37
In attempting to abolish the privity rule the courts have seized on the
point that prixity developed by judicial construction and not by legislative
enactment. Chief judge Desmond in Grecnbcrg v. Lorcnz said of the privity
rule: "But the present rule which we are being asked to modify is itself
of judicial making since our statutes say nothing at all about privity and in
early times such liabilities were thought to be in tort.... ."39 In stressing the
origin of the warranty action we are in reality getting back to the real
nature of the action. Since the early warranty cases were concerned with
contract actions, the courts came to apply contract theory to warranty
actions. The New York Court of Appeals has applied the six year contract
statute of limitations to warranty actions.:3 On the other hand there is
earlier language of the court of appeals noting that the action of warranty
may sound in tort rather than in contract.:10
A difficulty also arises from the language of the Uniform Sales Act. The
Sales Act states that a buyer "means a person who buys or agrees to buy
goods or any legal successor in interest of such person ." 41 The language
would appear to limit the action of implied warranty to the immediate
purchaser or someone who claims legal title through him. Some courts
hurdled the language of the statute by construing the term buyer to include
any person who in the reasonable contemplation of the seller might use
the goods.42
The Uniform Commercial Code now in effect in six states 3 expressly
prorides for an action in warranty by a person other than the immediate
purchaser. Section 2-318 states that:
36. 1 Williston, Sales § 195, at 501-02 (rev. ed. 1943).
37. Presser, Torts § 83, at 493 (2d ed. 1955).
3S. 9 N.Y.2d at 199-200, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S2d at 42. SQL also Chapman v.
Brown, 193 F. Supp. 7S (D. Hawaii 1961); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167
Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
39. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
40. Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1933). In this ca~s the
court of appeals said, "Even today, an action for breach of warranty is, in some rc2pzcts,
an action in tort .... Though the action may be brought solely for the breach of the
implied warranty, the breach is a wrongful act, a default and, in its ess.ential nature, a
tort." Id. at 33-34, 12 N.E.2d at 561.
41. Uniform Sales Act § 76(1).
42. See Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
43. Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island.
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A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.44
In the purpose clause attached to this section the drafters of the code state
that "the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer
who resells, extends to other persons in the distributive chain.1 45
The law regarding the need for privity in a warranty is thus still in a
state of flux in New York. The court of appeals has recognized that the
doctrine of privity is a judicial creature, but apparently intends to leave
the problem of its possible rejection to the legislature. The legislature on
the other hand has on three different occasions4" refused to act on bills
introduced to modify the privity rule. The matter is now approaching a
point of decision for either the court or the legislature. If the doctrine be
outmoded and if it be of judicial making, should not its modification be
a judicial function?
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of privity is properly a question for the courts, and it is
within the province of the courts to abrogate the rule universally recognized
as unduly harsh. But the court must distinguish between express and implied
warranties. Since express warranties arise out of the mutual assent of the
parties, they may properly be considered as arising under contract theory.
Implied warranties, however, are imposed by operation of law and should
be approached as tort violations.47 By analogy the same restrictions that
have been placed on negligence actions would be applicable to implied
warranties.48
44. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.
45. Ibid.
46. See notes 20-22 supra.
47. See Koerner, The Beleaguered Citadel of Privity in the Distributive Process of the
Sale of Goods, 7 N.Y.L.F. 176 (1961).
48. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
